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The Futures of  Global History 
Richard Drayton and David Motadel 
  
  
‘If  you believe you are a citizen of  the world, you are citizen of  nowhere’, declared Theresa 
May in autumn 2016 to the Tory party conference, questioning the patriotism of  those who 
still dared to question Brexit. Within a month, ‘Make America Great Again’ triumphed in 
the polls in the United States. From Erdogan’s Turkey, to Putin’s Russia, to Modi’s India, a 
current of  anti-globalization nationalisms is in full flow. 
The storm clouds are indeed dark. They seem even to cast their shadows on the world of  
historical scholarship, provoking the Princeton Latin American historian Jeremy Adelman to 
offer a lament about the academic field of  global history.  For Adelman, it seems, the 1
relevance of  the field derived from ‘globalization’ and its recent Whiggish boosters, ergo: 
‘In our fevered present of  Nation-X First, of  resurgent ethno-nationalism, what’s the point 
of  recovering global pasts?’. Contained in his rebuke of  global history, and of  its rootless 
cosmopolitan practitioners, is the idea that it sought to ‘eclipse’ national frames of  enquiry. 
It was not the first time that such a jeremiad about global history had issued from the sages 
of  Princeton’s Dickinson Hall. In late 2013, David Bell, the distinguished historian of  
France, had shrugged in a notorious New Republic book review, that ‘perhaps the “global 
turn,” for all of  its insights and instruction, has hit a point of  diminishing returns’.  ‘Perhaps 2
it is time’, Bell mused, ‘to turn back’ to the ‘small spaces’.  
 1
  Jeremy Adelman, ‘What is global history now’, Aeon, 2 March 2017. 
 2
  David Bell, ‘This is what happens when historians overuse the idea of  the network’, The New Republic, 26 
October 2013. 
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Adelman and Bell do put their fingers on many serious problems, and their swashbuckling 
essays provide a helpful basis for a reflection on the state of  global history. But the claim 
that ‘resurgent ethno-nationalism’ in some way challenges the premises of  global history is 
odd. For, as we shall examine in more detail later, global historians have long noted that 
forms of  ethno-national resistance to globalization were themselves responses to new kinds 
of  global connections. All the fundamentalist upheavals and jihads of  the last hundred years 
to give one obvious example, arose in response to increasing connection.  Modern 3
nationalisms, across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both inside and outside of  
Europe, in any event, were incubated within transnational and transimperial connections.  It 4
is not even a new story. The mercantilisms of  early modern European states, and the 
subsequent fabrications of  Louis XIV and Whig England, for example, responded to the 
new acceleration of  European and global trade propelled by the silver of  Potosí and the 
gold of  the Caribbean and Africa.  Anti-globalization is itself  a phenomenon of  5
globalization, and usually seeks to reconstitute the nation’s place in the world rather than to 
retreat into a disconnected autarky. Trump’s ‘America first’ and its international analogues 
 3
  Nikki R. Keddie, ‘The Revolt of  Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to 
Imperialism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 36, 3, 1994, pp. 463-487; and, more detailed, the contributions in David 
Motadel, ed., Islam and the European Empires, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. For a brilliant more general account of  
this dialectic, see Cemil Aydin, The Politics of  anti-Westernism in Asia: visions of  world order in pan-Islamic and pan-Asian thought, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
 4
  Rebecca Karl, Staging the world: Chinese nationalism at the turn of  the twentieth century, Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2002; James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The settler revolution and the rise of  the Anglo-World, 1783-1939, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009; and Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the nation in Imperial Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, provide fascinating case studies of  the emergence of  national consciousness (and nationalism) as the 
result of  global connections. Similarly, scholars have emphasised the importance of  transnational and transimperial 
connections in the history of  anti-imperial nationalism, see, for example, Jonathan Schneer, ‘Anti-imperial London: The 
pan-African conference of  1900’, in Felix Driver, ed., Imperial cities: Landscape, display and identity, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999, pp. 254-267; Benedict Anderson, Under three flags: Anarchism and the anti-colonial imagination, London: 
Verso, 2005; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian moment: self-determination and the international origins of  anticolonial nationalism, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007; Sugata  Bose, A hundred horizons: The Indian ocean in the age of  global empire, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009; Leslie James, George Padmore and decolonization from below, London: Palgrave, 2015; and 
Michael Goebel, Anti-colonial metropolis: Interwar Paris and the seeds of  Third World nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015. Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, ‘Global history and the spatial turn: From the impact of  area studies to 
the study of  critical junctures of  globalization’, Journal of  Global History, 5, 1, 2010, pp. 149-170 discuss the phenomenon in 
more general terms. 
  Richard Drayton, ‘Of  empire and political economy’, in Sophus Reinert and Pernille Røge, eds., The political 5
economy of  empire in the early modern world, London: Palgrave, 2008, pp. vii-xi; Pierre Vilar, A history of  gold and money, 1450-1920, 
New York: Verso, 1991; and Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, Early economic thought in Spain, 1177-1740, London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1978. 
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are only the most recent incarnations of  this reactionary dialectics.  
Even stranger is the idea, not confined to Adelman and Bell, that global history implies a 
rejection of  the smaller scales of  historical experience, in particular the nation. It is not 
merely that global historians are often keenly anchored in national history, or that much 
innovative recent work has operated at the level of  micro-history, following the experience 
of  the global in particular small places or through clusters of  individuals. More crucially, 
national history from its origins has been in dialogue with however people have understood 
the cosmopolitan. We might usefully rediscover how history at the scales of  the local, 
‘national’, regional, and global has been entangled from the very origins of  human study of  
the past. Such an enquiry might help us to better understand, beyond the vanities of  
polemic, where we are now and what might be the futures of  global history.  
The Pasts of  Global (and National) History 
Global history is an approach to the past which has two key modes. On the one hand, the 
comparative approach seeks to understand events in one place through examining their 
similarities with and differences how things happened somewhere else.  This is opposed to, 6
or combined with, the connective approach, which elucidates how history is made through 
the interactions of  geographically (or temporally) separate historical communities.  Both of  7
these are very old, although the connected and egalitarian terms on which the world’s 
histories met by the late Twentieth century gave them radically new meanings. 
  Patrick O’Brien, ‘Historiographical traditions and modern imperatives for the restoration of  global history’, 6
Journal of  Global History, 1, 1, 2006, pp. 3-39, provides a discussion of  the problem of  global history that leans heavily 
towards the comparative. For perhaps the most ambitious major recent work in comparative history, see Victor Lieberman, 
Strange Parallels, vol. 1 (Integration on the Mainland: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830) and vol. 2 (Mainland mirrors: 
Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands: Southeast Asia in global context, c. 800-1830), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003 and 2010. For one transit from comparative to global history, see Valéria Guimarães, ‘Da história comparada à 
história global: imprensa transnacional e o exemplo do le Messager de São Paulo’, Revista Instituto Histórico e Geográfico 
Brasileiro, 466, 2015, pp. 87-120. 
  Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Connected histories: Notes towards a reconfiguration of  early modern Eurasia’, Modern 7
Asian Studies, 31, 3, 1997, pp. 735-762; Serge Gruzinski, ‘Les mondes mêlés de la monarchie catholique et autres connected 
histories’, Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 56, 1, 2001, pp. 85-117. Caroline Douki and Philippe Minard, ‘Histoire globale, 
histoires connectées: Un changement d’échelle historiographique?’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 54-4bis, 5, 2007, 
pp. 7-21; Michael Werner und Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée 
und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28, 4, 2002, pp. 607-636; and idem, ‘Beyond 
comparison: Histoire croisée and the challenge of  reflexivity’, History and Theory, 45, 1, 2006, pp. 30-50. Or see, as an 
example, one classic connective work of  global history written from the perspective of  Latin America, Jeremy Adelman, 
Sovereignty and revolution in the Iberian Atlantic, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
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Sima Qian, born in the second century BCE, is considered the first and greatest of  the 
classical Chinese historians. The 130 chapters of  his Grand Scribe’s Records combine lapidary 
Tacitean studies of  personalities – not just rulers or generals, as was conventional, but 
artisans, assassins, artists, even among them women – with studies of  war, economy, society.  8
While China was his focus, Sima set his history into the context of  the non-Chinese world, 
drawing on ethnographic observations made by travellers and officials at all of  the Han 
Dynasty’s frontiers. Sima distinguished the Chinese through a discipline of  comparison with 
foreigners who, he insisted, were as human and full of  potential as his own people. 
Global history, at its foundations, is not a new genre. Universal history, by which we mean a 
history that seeks to tell a history of  all of  mankind, its origins, and perhaps its destiny, is in 
fact one of  the most ancient kinds of  history, always in connection with how each culture 
understood its peculiar history. The historians of  ancient Greece, from Herodotus onwards, 
framed their accounts of  Attic prowess relative to universal history. The ethno-national 
community was understood relative to the xenoi, the stranger friends at one’s immediate 
frontiers, and the barbaroi, those understood as radically different. In the hands of  Polybius 
and Eusebius, a tradition of  juxtaposing the inner history of  Romans and Christians to those 
who lay beyond set the frame for what became the discipline of  history a millennium later in 
modern Europe. But it was not confined to that western peninsula of  Asia, to the east, in 
the medieval Arab world al-Mas‘udi, al-Tabari, and Ibn Khaldun wrote histories of  the 
world, and in fourteenth-century Persia, Rashid al-Din brought together learned men from 
across Eurasia, including those born in China and Europe, to write a world history from the 
perspective of  the Mongols.  9
  The Grand scribe’s records, 9 vols., ed. By William J. Nienhauser, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994-. 8
On Sima Qian, see Siep Stuurman, ‘Herodotus and Sima Qian: History and the Anthropological Turn in Ancient Greece 
and Han China’, Journal of  World History, 19, 1, 2008, pp. 1-40; and Craig Benjamin, ‘But from this time forth history 
becomes a connected whole’: State expansion and the origins of  universal history, Journal of  Global History, 9, 3, 2014, pp. 
357-78. 
  El-Mas‘udi’s historical encyclopedia, entitled ‘Meadows of  gold and mines of  gems’, 8 vols., London: Oriental Translation 9
Fund of  Great Britain and  Ireland, 1841; The history of  al-Tabari: An annotated translation, 40 vols., New York: State University 
of  New York Press, 1985-1998; Ibn Khaldūn,The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1958; and Rashiduddin Fazlullah’s Jamiʻuʼt tawarikh: compendium of  chronicles, 3 vols., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Department of  Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1998-1999. 
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National history, in its nineteenth century European incarnations, was similarly intertwined 
with a kind of  global history. If  Ranke is the symbol of  nation-centred history, it must 
always be remembered that he and his disciples around Europe, such as Acton in England 
and Monod in France, understood the careful study of  the archival trace at the level of  the 
nation to be only a preliminary to some future enterprise of  universal history. This was the 
high play Ranke indulged in his essay on ‘Die großen Mächte’.  His Geschichten der 10
romanischen und germanischen Völker sought to examine the historical event both in its local 
particularity (that ‘eigentlich’, which is generally mistranslated as ‘actually’), and its general 
universal character.  Its first chapter explained that at the core of  the common history of  11
Europe were three ‘external enterprises’: great migrations, the Crusades, and the 
colonization of  foreign countries.  
The Rankeans’ view of  universal history had the shared history of  Christendom at its heart, 
from which modern world civilization was assumed to diffuse. Such a perspective was in 
quiet collusion with a post-1815 world order for which Europe appeared to be the military, 
technical and economic vanguard. Its impact, which endured into the late twentieth century, 
was to constitute extra-European history as either the imperial history of  European nations, 
or as exotic theatres of  marginal relevance to the main forces and events in universal history. 
Challenges to diffusionist universal history, such as Eric Williams’s Capitalism and Slavery 
(1944), were greeted with hostility or studiously ignored.  Hugh Trevor-Roper’s infamous 12
description of  African history in 1965 as ‘the meaningless gyrations of  barbarous tribes in 
picturesque but irrelevant corners of  the globe’ was perhaps the swan song of  that way of  
seeing which subordinated universal history to the Whiggish self-constructions of  each 
European nation and a collective eurocentrism.  13
  Leopold Ranke, ‘Die großen Mächte’, Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift 2, 1833, pp. 1-51. 10
  Ranke’s ‘eigentlich’ is not merely a positivistic claim, it is an Aristotelian assertion of  how that which was actual 11
was the concrete expression of  the universal or general, see Leopold Ranke, Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker 
von 1494 bis 1535, Leipzig and Berlin: Reimer, 1824. The essays in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ed., Leopold von Ranke und die 
moderne Geschichtswissenschaft, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988, provide some further insights. 
  Eric Williams, Capitalism and slavery, Chapel Hill, NC: University of  North Carolina Press, 1944. For a discussion 12
of  Williams and other Caribbean and Latin American nineteenth- and early twentieth-century precursors to global history 
see Rafael Marquese and João Paulo Pimenta, ‘Tradições de história global na América Latina e no Caribe’, História da 
Historiografia, 17, 2015, pp. 30-49. 
  Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The rise of  Christian Europe’, The Listener 70, 1963, pp. 871-5, p. 871. 13
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Global history, as we know it, came out of  two post-1950 revolutionary changes. The first, 
obvious, and often invoked, was the collapse of  the European empires and the demand from 
and for post-colonial nations for their ‘own’ histories and for a share in the story of  the 
cosmopolitan. Decolonization challenged the white supremacist assumptions which had 
quietly ordered two centuries of  the human sciences in the West. Euro-American universities 
responded to this after c. 1960 by sprouting ‘area studies’ enclaves, although new strength in 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East was often at the margins of  history departments in which 
national and European history remained dominant. As the West’s universities gradually 
opened themselves to people of  colour and scholars from the non-West, however, these 
margins grew in their strength and centrality.  
The second intertwined revolution, rarely recognised, was the impact of  ‘history from 
below’. Historical practice after 1960 no longer found its inevitable centre in understanding 
the voices of  those privileged white men preserved in the West’s state archives. Once we 
began to pay attention to historical agents below the level of  the state, we looked outwards: 
E.P. Thompson’s classic 1967 essay on time and work-discipline in Britain, for example, 
repeatedly reaches towards transnational comparison.  People now sought to understand 14
historical processes from the view of, and through the agency of  subordinate groups. There 
is a direct epistemological connection between the inclusion of  women, the poor and non-
whites as historical agents, and a new late twentieth-century attention to historical agents in 
and from the ‘Global South’. New attention went towards understanding ‘Western’ science 
and philosophy as shaped by imperial expansion and extra-European agency.  To this extent, 15
there is no way back out of  the ‘global turn’ in our century, any more than we could go back 
to a history which paid no attention to women or the poor.  
  E. P. Thompson, ‘Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism’, Past & Present, 38, 1, 1967, pp. 56-97. 14
  Richard Drayton, Nature’s government: Science, imperial Britain and the ‘improvement’ of  the world, New Haven, CT: Yale 15
University Press, 2000; and Susan Buck Morss, ‘Hegel and Haiti’, Critical Inquiry, 26, 4, 2000, pp. 821-865. 
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The World History Association emerged in the United States in 1982. It reflected how in 
schools and universities in that country, uninterrogated ‘Western Civilization’ courses were 
giving way to new attention to extra-European history and international interactions.  
Underpinning the initiative was a new body of  bold transnational histories which rethought 
universal history under the impress of  ‘area studies’ history, in particular the work of  
William McNeill, Marshall Hodgson, Philip Curtin and Sidney Mintz.   In 1990, the World 16
History Association founded the Journal of  World History, now in its 28th volume, which Jerry 
Bentley, its founding editor, declared would foster ‘historical analysis undertaken not from 
the viewpoint of  national states, but rather from that of  the global community’.  Patrick 17
O’Brien, then Director of  the Institute of  Historical Research in London, began in 1996 to 
organise a seminar series on ‘Global history over the very long term’, which was quickly 
partnered by a ‘World History Seminar’ organised by John Darwin, Peter Carey and one of  
the authors of  this article, Richard Drayton, in Oxford. Yet it is fair to say that the vast 
majority of  historians paid very little attention to these initiatives, in particular in Britain. 
 See William P. McNeill, The rise of  the west: A history of  the human community. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963 and 16
Plagues and Peoples New York: Garden Press, 1976; Marshall Hodgson extraordinary 1960s essays, collected 
posthumously as Marshall G. S Hodgson, Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam and World History, edited by 
Edmund G. Burke III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 and The Venture of  Islam: Conscience and History in a 
World Civilization Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974, vols 1-3; Philip Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; and Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of  Sugar in Modern History 
London: Allen Lane, 1985. 
  Jerry H. Bentley, 'A New Forum for Global History' Journal of  World History, 1990, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. iii-v. 17
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‘Global history’ acquired a new momentum, visibility and sense of  collective purpose, 
however, with the cresting of  both the realities and idea of  ‘globalization’ around 2000. A 
Cambridge workshop on the History of  Globalization in summer 2000, which resulted in A. 
G. Hopkins’s edited volume Globalization in World History, was both a symbol of, and 
stimulus to this new tide.  Two books in particular marked the new moment: Kenneth 18
Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence (2000), perhaps the most influential single twenty-first 
century work of  history, and Christopher Bayly’s The Birth of  the Modern World – the latter 
appearing in 2004, the bicentenary of  the Haitian Revolution, with the startling image of  the 
Black Jacobin Citoyen Belley on its cover.  Excited by the rise of  Asia in the 1990s, global 19
economic historians began a vast project to assess why in the mid-eighteenth century it was 
Europe, and not China or India, that took the leap to industrialization and ‘modernity’.  20
Pulled by historians of  slavery, American historians became increasingly receptive to the 
project of  Atlantic History.  Indian ocean history and other ‘thallasologies’ emerged quickly 21
 18
  A. G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in world history, London: Pimlico, 2002; see also idem, ‘The historiography of  
globalization and the globalization of  regionalism’, Journal of  the Economic and Social History of  the Orient, 53, 1/2, 2010, pp. 
19-36; and idem, American empire: A global history, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. 
  Kenneth Pomeranz, The great divergence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000; and Christopher Bayly, 19
The birth of  the modern world, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004. Strikingly, the image of  Citoyen Belley also appeared on the 
cover of  Jürgen Osterhammel, Sklaverei und die Zivilisation des Westens, Munich 2000, which was published around the same 
time. 
  Pomeranz was only the best known historian on this terrain, see also Bin Wong, China transformed: Historical change 20
and the limits of  European experience, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000; Joseph Inikori, Africans and the industrial 
revolution in England: A study in international trade and economic development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, and 
Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why Europe became rich and Asia did not: Global economic divergence, 1600-1850, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
  Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The many headed hydra: Sailors, slaves, commoners, and the hidden history of  the 21
revolutionary Atlantic, London: Verso, 2000; and Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic history: Concept and contours, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005. 
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in the wake of  the Atlanticists.     Migration and diasporas became central objects of  22
research  in relation to these oceanic histories.  23
  Kären Wigen, ‘Introduction: Oceans of  History Forum’, The American Historical Review, 111, 3, 2006, pp. 717–22
721; Markus P. M. Vink, ‘Indian Ocean studies and the “new thalassology”’, Journal of  Global History, 2, 1, 2007, pp. 41-62; 
Isabel Hofmeyr, ‘The Black Atlantic meets the Indian Ocean: forging new paradigms of  transnationalism for the Global 
South: literary and cultural perspectives’, Social Dynamics, 33, 2, 2007, pp. 3-32; Matt K. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: A History of  
Seas, Peoples, and Cultures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder, eds., 
Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 
1830s to the 1930s Leiden: Brill, 2011. 
        See inter alia Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction London: University College London Press, 1997;  23
Ulrike Freitag and W. G. Clarence-Smith, eds., Hadrami Statesmen, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s to 1960s 
Leiden: Brill, 1997; John Thornton, Africa and the Africans in the Making of  the Atlantic World , 1400-1800 Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998; Adam M McKeown, ‘Global Migration, 1846-1940’, Jl of  World History, 2005, 15, pp. 
155-189; Andrew Arsan, Interlopers of  Empire: The Lebanese diaspora in colonial French West Africa, London: Hurst, 2014. 
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In 2003, a large grant launched the Global Economic History Network, connected 49 
historians in universities across the world. Out of  its momentum came the Journal of  Global 
History, which located itself  explicitly in the terrain of  the history of  globalization, asserting 
through this a ‘subtle difference between the closely related endeavours of  global and world 
history’.  No consensus emerged, then or since, however, about the utility of  this 24
distinction between ‘world’ and ‘global’ history, and in practice these flags sheltered very 
similar initiatives. A decolonised British imperial history chose to go global under the flag of  
‘world history’, perhaps because it better represented the federal nature of  its alliance with 
‘area studies’ history.  In 2006 in Cambridge, for example, the ‘Extra-European History 25
Group’ of  the Faculty of  History became the ‘World History Group’, with its seminar 
rechristened from the Commonwealth and Overseas History Seminar to the World History 
Seminar.  From 2009, in London, similarly, the then eighty-year old Imperial History 26
seminar, became the ‘Imperial and World History seminar’.  Elsewhere, at least for the 
post-1750 period, the banner of  –‘transnational history’ has effectively taken some or all of  
the terrain of  global history. The appointment of  historians from post-colonial countries, in 
particular India, to prestigious departments in the West, brought the views from the 
periphery into the centre. ‘Area studies’ historians began to write, or more accurately to be 
read, as global historians. European historians began (slowly) to take down the firewall 
between national and colonial history. British historians in the United States led here, in a 
cunning tactic to justify saving posts in their field. French historians soon followed, 
rediscovering C. L. R. James’s long ignored arguments about the interdependence of  the 
French and Haitian revolutions.  At the same time, dramatic falls in travel costs made it 27
  William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Kenneth Pomeranz and Peer Vries, ‘Editorial’, Journal of  Global History 1, 1, 24
2006, pp. 1-2. 
 25
  For the global turn in British imperial history see John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of  the British 
World-System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; and John Darwin, ‘Empire and Globe’, in Maxine Berg, ed. 
Writing the History of  the Global: Challenges for the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 197-99.  For a 
discussion of  the politics of  the relationship between imperial and global history see Richard Drayton, ‘Where does the 
Where Does the World Historian Write From? Objectivity, Moral Conscience and the Past and Present of  Imperialism, 
Journal of  Contemporary History, 46, 3, 2011, pp. 671-85. 
 26
  Richard Drayton in 2003 had already changed the faculty web page to describe ‘Extra-European History’ as ‘a 
Cambridge name for two things: the histories of  Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific, on the one hand, and 
comparative approaches to world history, which often intrude into the histories of  Europe and the United States, on the 
other’. 
  C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo revolution, London: Secker and Warburg, 27
1938. 
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possible for students to undertake international multi-archival doctoral research projects. 
Both the theory and practice of  global history became newly attractive.  28
The Challenges of  Global History 
 28
  Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, ed., The Cambridge World History, 7 vols. in 9 books, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015 and Akira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., A History of  the World, 6 vols., Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012-, for guides to the state of  play in this rapidly changing field.  
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The wave of  global history has, however, met with some resistance. Adelman and Bell in a 
way speak for many – and some of  their criticisms are wholly fair. There is, for example, 
clearly an inflationary use of  words like global, transnational, and intercultural. These are 
now brands under which, as Matt Connelly noted, historians often retail ‘very conventional 
kinds of  scholarship’.  The field remains driven covertly by Western priorities, with the 29
‘divergence debate’ and the global history of  the French Revolution, to take two prominent 
examples, returning us often by non-western routes to the idols of  the old ‘Rise of  the West’ 
historiography. It was within temporal boundary markers derived from European history 
that such masters of  the genre as Bayly and Osterhammel ordered their global panoramas 
(although the latter chose to have no cut-off  dates in the title of  his book). Global history, in 
general, is dominated by anglophone historians who seem unable or indisposed to read 
history written in other languages.  How many historians outside rich universities in rich 30
countries have access to the books, or can travel easily to foreign archives and conferences 
they would need to play the game of  ‘global history’? As Boubacar Barry, the doyen of  
history in Senegal, asked the opening plenary of  the European Network in Universal and 
Global History Conference in Paris in 2014, what exactly did ‘global history’ mean when 
Africans like himself  found it almost impossible to obtain a Schengen visa? As Adelman 
bemoans, ‘the high hopes for cosmopolitan narratives about ‘encounters’ between 
Westerners and Resterners led to some pretty one-way exchanges about the shape of  the 
global’. There are risks, inherent to global approaches, that while similarities and 
convergences are identified, or sometimes forced, differences and interruptions are 
ignored.  31
 29
  C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, 
‘AHR Conversation: On transnational  history’, The American Historical Review, 111, 5, 2006, pp. 1441-1464, p. 1447. 
 It is particularly striking how Comparativ:Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende 30
Gesellschaftsforschung,  founded in 1990, making it almost as old as the Journal of World History, and 
which over 28 volumes has engaged with all the international developments in global history, is very 
rarely cited by anglophone historians.  Only two chapters of J. Belich, John Darwin and Margret Frenz, 
eds., The Prospect of Global History Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 2016, appear to engage seriously 
with historical work not in English. 
  Frederick Cooper, ‘What is the concept of  globalization good for? An African historian’s perspective’, African 31
Affairs, 100, 2001, pp. 189-213, for the case of  African history; and Samuel Moyn, ‘On the nonglobalization of  ideas’, in 
Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, pp. 187-204, 
for the case of  intellectual history, are studies which have problematised the phenomenon. 
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But many of  Bell and Adelman’s criticisms of  this young field seem exaggerated and 
eccentric. It is true that there has been a dramatic number of  new appointments in non-
Western and global history, in particular in American and British universities, over the last 
decade. But Bell and Adelman’s implication that the global has become hegemonic, 
displacing other fields, is rather off  the mark. ‘For many years now, it has been the rage 
among historians to uncover past global connections’, David Bell writes. Hardly. Few 
historians commit themselves to the comparative and connective approaches, the signature 
methods of  global history as a genre. In our seminar rooms and conference halls, national 
history is and remains the dominant form of  historical inquiry. Across the world, the vast 
majority of  university professorships and academic journals remain dedicated to national 
history. National histories – such as The English and their History (2015), the little island story 
of  Brexit drummer Robert Tombs – are at the top of  our bestseller lists.  Pierre Nora’s 32
vituperative denunciation of  the Histoire mondiale de la France (2017) was emblematic of  a 
wider rejection by key French intellectuals of  its attempt to understand French history as a 
dimension of  global processes.  Those appointed as South Asian, Chinese and Middle 33
Eastern historians usually work as faithfully within the national paradigm as almost all 
French historians, while not all ‘area studies’ historians welcome the transgressions of  global 
history. National history remains the mode through which most contributions to ‘world 
history’ or ‘international history’ happen. It is rather premature of  Bell to worry about 
‘diminishing returns’. 
While global history is a charismatic field, it is small and weak. It will take more than two or 
three generations to overcome the profound eurocentricity of  our discipline. We should not 
exaggerate how representative our history departments have become. Token Africanists and 
Middle Easternists are asked to represent the histories of  entire regions over millennia. In 
Britain, as Adelman admits, Latin American history has fewer posts than around 1980. Huge 
areas of  the human past remain in darkness. To take one startling case, there are about a 
dozen specialist historians of  Indonesia, which has a population equivalent to Europe’s, 
outside the Netherlands and Australia. 
 32
  Robert Tombs, The English and their history, London: Penguin, 2015. 
 33
  Patrick Boucheron, ed., Histoire mondiale de la France, Paris: Seuil, 2017; and, for the review, Pierre Nora, ‘Histoire 
mondiale de la France’, L’Obs, 2734, 30 March 2017, pp. 68-9. For a review in English, see Robert Darnton, ‘A buffet of  
French history’, The New York Review of  Books, 64, 8, 11 May 2017. 
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It is true that connection remains prized by global historians. But is Adelman right that they 
are only concerned about, ‘integration and concord, rather than disintegration and discord’? 
On the contrary, considerable attention has gone to things which do not flow, and to 
resistances to the global which emerge within globalizations. Serge Gruzinski in La pensée 
métisse (1999) and Les quatres parties du monde (2004) has described how what he calls 
‘European standardisation’, a kind of  cultural resistance to the impact of  the exotic, 
accompanied Habsburg expansion into the early modern world.  Margot Finn has similarly 34
written about ‘frictions’ as a dimension of  the imperial experience, of  resistance and 
opposition to flows and exchanges.  Commodity historians have written about the ‘anti-35
commodity’ as a phenomenon which arises in the midst of  global exchange.  Interruptions, 36
reversals, and processes of  de-globalization have long been of  interest to global historians. 
Historians have demonstrated again and again that periods of  global integration could end. 
Such major works as Bayly’s Birth of  the Modern World, Jürgen Osterhammel’s Verwandlung der 
Welt (2009; published in English as Transformation of  the World, in 2014) – and indeed such 
precursors as Marshall Hodgson and Michael Mann – examined the fragility of  global 
connections and the dynamics of  disruption.  There is a voluminous body of  work on the 37
breakdown of  connections in the early modern Islamic imperial world. The ‘divergence 
debate’, from Pomeranz to Prasannan Parthasarathi’s Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not 
(2011), has been about breakdowns of  trade links, as much as connections.  Harold James’s 38
perceptive Creation and Destruction of  Value (2009) has shown that breakdowns of  
 34
  Serge Gruzinski, La pensée métisse, Paris: Fayard, 1999; and idem, Les Quatres Parties du monde: Histoire d’une 
mondialisation, Paris: La Martinière, 2004. 
 35
  Margot Finn, ‘Frictions of  empire: Colonial Bombay’s probate and property networks in the 1780s’, Annales: 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 65, 5, 2010, pp. 1175-1204. 
 36
  The essays in Sandip Hazareesingh and Harro Maat, eds., Local subversions of  colonial cultures: Commodities and anti-
commodities in global history, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016 provide a good overview. 
 37
  Bayly, The birth of  the modern world; Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts, Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009; and for the earlier works, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, Rethinking world history: Essays on 
Europe, Islam and world history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and Michael Mann, The sources of  social power, 4 
vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press, 1986-2013. 
 38
  Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich and Asia did not. 
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globalization have as much been part of  the world’s economic activity as integration.  39
Vanessa Ogle’s Global Transformation of  Time (2015) is as much about the local and national 
fractures of  globalization as about any seamless and coherent convergence.  Pierre 40
Singaravélou’s luminous Tianjin Cosmopolis (2017) reveals the overlap of  globalization and its 
crisis in a single frame.  Studying interruptions and connections are not mutually exclusive. 41
 39
  Harold James, The creation and destruction of  value: The globalization cycle, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009. 
 40
  Vanessa Ogle, The global transformation of  time: 1870-1950, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. For 
the fractured time of  globalization, its contradictory flows which integrate ‘una pluralidad de temporalidades, con diferentes 
ritmos’ see also Hugo Fazio, ‘La Historia Global: ¿Encrucijada de la Contemporaneidad?’, Revista de Estudios Sociales, 23, 
2006, pp. 59-72. 
 41
  Pierre Singaravélou, Tianjin Cosmopolis: Une autre histoire de la mondialisation, Paris: Seuil, 2017. 
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Nor is it fair to condemn global history as focused on elite actors. Global history made 
visible the outsiders – slaves, the colonised and other actors at the margins long ignored by 
the discipline in the West. James’s Black Jacobins (1938), ignored by the generation of  French 
historians who trained Bell, is only an early example. In his pioneering work of  global labour 
history, Workers of  the World, Marcel van der Linden’s has looked at ordinary workers, 
farmers and sharecroppers – not the winners of  globalization.  Others, like L.L. Robson, 42
Roger Ekrich, and Clare Anderson, have traced the transportation of  convicts to penal 
colonies.  The wretched of  Van Diemen’s Land or Devil’s Island were hardly a 43
cosmopolitan elite. Historians like Myron Echenberg, Timothy Parsons, Gregory Mann, 
David Killingray, and Tarak Barkawi have brought back the experiences of  hundreds of  
thousands of  colonial subalterns in the world wars.  New transimperial and transnational 44
histories have illuminated the global life of  religion in the flows of  ordinary believers – 
missionaries, pious slaves, and hajj pilgrims.  Global historians have always shown an 45
 42
  Marcel van der Linden, Workers of  the world: Essay toward a global labor history, Leiden: Brill, 2008; and, for an 
excellent case study, Minu Haschemi Yekani, Koloniale Arbeit: Rassismus, Migration und Herrschaft in Tansania (1885-1914), 
Cologne: Campus, 2018. 
 43
  L.L. Robson, The convict settlers of  Australia: An enquiry into the origin and character of  the convicts transported to New South 
Wales and Van Diemen’s Land 1787-1852, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1976; A. Roger Ekrich, Bound for America: 
The transportation of  British Convicts to the colonies, 1718-1775, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; Clare Anderson, Legible bodies: 
Race, criminality and colonialism in South Asia, London: Bloomsbury, 2004; and idem, Subaltern Lives: Biographies of  Colonialism in 
the Indian Ocean World, 1790-1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
  Myron J. Echenberg, Colonial conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa 1857-1960, London: James 44
Currey, 1991; Timothy H. Parsons, The African rank-and-file: Social implications of  colonial military service in the King’s African Rifles, 
1902-1964, London: James Currey, 1999; Gregory Mann, Native sons: West African veterans and France in the twentieth century, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006; David Killingray, Fighting for Britain: African soldiers in the Second World War, 
London: Boydell and Brewer, 2012; and Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of  empire: Indian and British armies in World War II, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
  Barbara Watson Andaya, ‘Between empires and emporia: The economics of  Christianization in early modern 45
Southeast Asia’, Journal of  the Economic and Social History of  the Orient 52, 4-5, 2009, pp. 963-97; William Gervase Clarence-
Smith, Islam and the abolition of  slavery, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; John P. Slight, The British empire and the hajj, 
1865-1956, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015; and contributions in Umar Ryad, ed., The hajj and Europe in the 
age of  empire, Leiden: Brill, 2016. The chapters in Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene, eds., Religious internationals in the modern 
world: Globalization and faith communities since 1750, New York, 2012, provide further insights into the globalised worlds of  
faith communities in modern history. 
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interest in the losers of  global integration, and in those who travelled in steerage rather than 
on the promenade deck.  46
  Adam McKeown, Melancholy order: Asian migration and the globalization of  borders, New York: Columbia University 46
Press, 2008 and  Sunil Amrith, Crossing the Bay of  Bengal: The furies of  nature and the fortunes of  migrants, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013.  
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Moreover, global history has never just focused on globetrotters. Adelman’s binary of  
‘globalists’ versus ‘the ones who cannot move’ does not stand. Historians have repeatedly 
illuminated how global integration engaged people who otherwise appear isolated from the 
global. Take the movement of  commodities – sugar, silver, diamonds, tea, porcelain, opium, 
and so on – which changed the lives of  people no matter how mobile they were.  As 47
Fernand Braudel reminded us in the very first number of  Annales, the impact of  Caribbean 
gold crossing to Spain, for example, affected the trans-Saharan caravan trade in the interior 
of  Africa.  Later, simultaneous with the rise of  the trading cities of  Western Europe and the 48
slave plantations of  the Atlantic came the Second Serfdom: east of  a line which stretched 
from Hamburg to Venice, peasants were re-subordinated to a fierce discipline which ensured 
that wheat flowed to Danzig, Riga, Stettin, and Wismar, and the products of  the East and 
West Indies, flowed to their masters.  Tracing the flows of  tobacco and chocolate in the 49
Atlantic World, Marcy Norton’s Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures (2008) has vividly demonstrated 
how seamen and colonists from the Americas brought these products to Europe, from 
where they spread to the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.  As tobacco and chocolate became 50
more available, consumers in the most remote corners of  the globe developed a taste for 
them. They might not have gone into the world, but the world came to them. Similarly, 
scholars of  France have shown that global trade affected economy and society even of  
  What we might call the Warwick school of  global economic history has explored in particular how luxury goods 47
opened and thickened Eurasian connections with consequences which reached deep into the commercial hinterlands, see 
Maxine Berg, ‘Asian Luxuries and the Making of  the European Consumer Revolution, in Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, 
eds., Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2002, pp. 228-244;  
Giorgio Riello, Cotton: The Fabric that Made the Modern World Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013; Maxine 
Berg, Felicia Gottmann, Hanna Hodacs, Chris Nierstrasz, eds., Goods from the East, 1600-1800: Trading Eurasia, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2015; Peter McNeil and Giorgio Riello, Luxury: A Rich History Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
 48
  Fernand Braudel, ‘Monnaies et civilisations: De l’or du Soudan à l’argent d’Amérique’, Annales: Économies, 
Sociétés, Civilisations, 1, 1, 1946, pp. 9-22.  For a more recent and wider ranging intervention see Toby Green, ‘Africa and the 
Price Revolution: Currency imports and socio-economic change in West and West-Central Africa during the seventeenth 
century, Jl of  African History, 2016,  57 (1), pp. 1-24 and  A Fistfull of  Shells: Money, Power and 
Revolution in Africa During the Atlantic Slave Trade Era London: Allen Lane, 2018 forthcoming. 
 49
  Fernand Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, economie et capitalisme, vol. 2 (Les jeux de l’échange), Paris: Armand Colin, 
1979, pp. 310-317; and Richard Drayton, ‘The collaboration of  labour’, in Hopkins, ed., Globalization in world history, pp. 
98-114, p. 102. For an explanation of  the vital connection between export of  sugar and coffee to the Baltic hinterlands of  
the Hanse cities and the French colonial economy, see idem, ‘The globalisation of  France: Provincial cities and French 
expansion, 1500-1800’, History of  European Ideas, 34, 2008, pp. 424-430. 
  Marcy Norton, Sacred gifts, profane pleasures: A history of  tobacco and chocolate in the Atlantic World, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 50
University Press, 2008. 
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apparently ‘isolated’ places in eighteenth-century France’s interior.  Even the most rooted 51
actors could have a cup of  coffee, smoke a cigar, or sell cotton shirts in the local shop. Even 
the most isolated hermit couldn’t (and can’t) escape global influences. Much as David 
Armitage has argued for a ‘Cis-Atlantic history’, that is to say a history of  regions which 
were shaped by the distant effects of  Atlantic interactions, so we must insist on a cis-global 
history, lived in territories far from the apparent hot spots of  trans-global processes or 
circulation.  52
  Emma Rothschild, ‘Isolation and economic life in eighteenth-century France’, The American Historical Review, 119, 51
4, 2014, pp. 1055-1082. 
  David Armitage, ‘Three concepts of  Atlantic history’, in David Armitage and M. Braddick, eds., The British 52
Atlantic world, 1500-1800, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 11-27. 
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Even less is global history guilty of  Bell’s charge of  neglecting individuals. Indeed, there is 
now a growing field of  global micro history – centred on the individual and family – which 
has shed light on major historical phenomena and should not be easily dismissed.  Natalie 53
Zemon-Davis (among others) has looked at the odyssey of  Berber geographer Leo 
Africanus.  John-Paul Ghobrial has traced the seventeenth-century global adventures of  the 54
Ottoman priest Ilias of  Babylon, from Europe to South America.  While Linda Colley, as 55
Bell notes, has pursued the global trajectory of  Elizabeth Marsh, Emma Rothschild has used 
the global lives of  the Scottish Johnstone family as a lens through which to see the inner life 
of  Britain’s global empire.  Gagan Sood has used a single cache of  documents to illuminate 56
how family, religion, and kinship ties ordered the economic and cultural life of  Islamicate 
west Asia in the middle of  the eighteenth century.  Jean Hébrard and Rebecca Scott have 57
followed the trajectory of  Rosalie, a slave from Senegambia in the Age of  Revolution.  And 58
one of  the authors of  this article, David Motadel, is tracing the story of  two globetrotting 
Persian shahs, who roamed the aristocratic world of  the fin de siècle, from the Ottoman 
borderlands to the shores of  Scotland, to offer a reinterpretation of  the relationships 
between the world’s sovereigns in an age of  European domination.  It is true that many 59
global historians – particularly those of  the great syntheses – prioritise structures over 
individuals, but this bias is surely as characteristic of  national history. Where they do – as in 
  Francesca Trivellato, ‘Microstoria, storia del mundo e storia globale’, in Paola Lanaro, ed., Microstoria: A 53
venticinque anni da l’eredità immateriale, Milan: Franco Angeli, 2011, pp. 119-32, for a discussion of  the problematic. De Vito 
and Gerritsen have framed a manifesto for a ‘micro-spatial’ global history, see Christian G. De Vito and Anne Gerritsen, 
eds., Micro-Spatial Histories of  Global Labour London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
 54
  Natalie Zemon-Davis, Trickster travels: A sixteenth-century Muslim between worlds, London: Faber and Faber, 2006. 
  John-Paul Ghobrial, ‘The secret life of  Elias of  Babylon and the uses of  global microhistory’, Past and Present, 55
222, 1, 2014, pp. 51-93. 
  Linda Colley, The Ordeal of  Elizabeth Marsh: A Woman in World History, New York: Pantheon, 2007; and Emma 56
Rothschild, The inner life of  empires: An eighteenth-century history, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
  Gagan Sood, India and the Islamic heartlands: An eighteenth-century world of  circulation and exchange, Cambridge: 57
Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
  Rebecca Scott and Jean M. Hébrard, Freedom papers: An Atlantic odyssey in the age of  emancipation, Cambridge, MA: 58
Harvard University Press, 2011. 
  David Motadel, ‘Qajar shahs in Imperial Germany’, Past and Present, 213, 1, 2010, pp. 191-235, provides some 59
first insights. 
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Robert Allen and Sven Beckert’s very different attempts to explain the early modern global 
context for nineteenth-century industrial production – they surely answer Bell’s opposite 
assertion that global history neglects making broader arguments and overarching narratives.  60
While some global historians are tempted by David Christian’s ‘Big History’, the vast 
majority prefer not to surrender their methods to the uncertain guesses of  the natural 
sciences, and continue to work on sources and problems which address much smaller spaces, 
recent times, and human agency and experience.  61
To be resisted equally is the idea that global history is, or needs to be, the luxury trade of  an 
elite minority. There is certainly a kind of  global history practiced, as Adelman charged, by 
the ‘upper echelons of  a higher education committed to an idyll of  global citizenship’. But 
the historical profession in general is dominated by the offspring of  the Euro-American 
white upper middle class, and one is more likely to find exceptions to this in global history 
than in many other fields.   
Less controversial, however, should be Adelman’s warning that, ‘It is hard not to conclude 
that global history is another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a 
cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues.’ There are indeed real inequalities, as 
we noted earlier, in the global trade in historical ideas: few are those who read in other 
European languages, let alone write in them, while rarer still are any capacities to read 
sources in Arabic, Chinese or Hindi. One might insist, though, this is not a problem peculiar 
to global history. United States historians of  France are increasingly notorious for citing very 
little historiography not published in English. Global history, as in the hands of  Dipesh 
Chakrabarty among others, quite to the contrary has provided a vehicle through which 
historical perspectives shaped by Asian, African and Caribbean intellectual and language 
environments, have quietly penetrated the Western mainstream.  62
Towards a new global (and national) history 
  Robert C. Allen, The British industrial revolution in global perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; 60
and Sven Beckert, Empire of  cotton: A global history, New York: Knopf, 2014. For a global microhistorical approach on 
economic history, see Christof  Dejung, Die Fäden des globalen Marktes: Eine Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des Welthandels am Beispiel 
der Handelsfirma Gebrüder Volkart 1851-1999, Cologne, 2013. 
  David Christian, Maps of  Time: An Introduction to ‘Big History’, Berkeley, CA: University of  California Press, 2004; 61
and David Christian, ‘The Return of  Universal History’, History and Theory, 49, 4 (2010), pp. 5-26; and, similarly, for the 
bridging prehistory and the neurosciences to an explanation of  the origins of  European modernity see  Daniel Lord Smail, 
On Deep History of  the Brain, Berkeley, CA: University of  California Press, 2008. 
  Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference, Princeton: Princeton University 62
Press, 2000. 
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Global history has never been a demand that historians only pay attention to ‘big’ 
transnational phenomena. Its more important meaning is a change in the explanans of  
history: a new sensitivity to the historical agents, forces and factors at scales above and below 
that of  the nation or region. As Christophe Charle concluded, in a brilliant essay of  2013:  
The global and the national approaches are neither radically incompatible universes, nor 
Russian dolls which nest simply and harmoniously one within the other, because each 
contributes to destabilise the other by obliging it to reconsider the implicit presuppositions 
on which it rests, and thus [together they] relaunch perpetually the question of  the 
articulation of  the scales of  historical experience and of  the diversity of  themes which 
need to be taken into consideration, from the most particular to the most general.  63
  Christophe Charle, ‘Histoire globale, histoire nationale? Comment réconcilier recherche et pédagogie’, Le Débat, 63
3, 175, 2013, pp. 60-8. 
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For Ranke and his heirs, an uninterrogated global was central to making national history. So 
too, in our moment, from quite the other direction, a self-conscious global history neither 
neglects ‘the small spaces’ nor evades the specificity and strangeness of  disconnected 
historical experience. It is instead an invitation to the historian to be self-conscious of  the 
jeux d’échelles, of  the interdependence of  the scales of  space – village, province, nation, 
region and world – and time – days, decades, centuries – through which we explore and 
explain the past.  A whole new genre of  national histories is emerging with deliberately and 
self-consciously engage with the global.   No longer can we find the motor for the industrial 64
revolution in the history of  Lancashire, nor the causes for the French Revolution in the 
politics of  Paris versus Versailles.  The impact of  global history is already visible in the 65
transnational historical practice of  those who do not think of  themselves as global historians 
– one thinks of  the European history of  Richard J. Evans and Christopher Clark, or of  
Adam Tooze’s experiment with an entangled European and United States history.  Pace 66
David Bell, there is no way home to even a French national history which finds its first or 
final causes purely within the hexagon. This is not to say that the global frame of  reference 
is always the most relevant one, events at smaller scales of  experience often unfold, and must 
be understood through, their own local logic. To be a global historian is often to study very 
specific places, institutions, and people and not to pretend to any general or generalizable 
claim.  67
  See Boucheron, ed., Histoire mondiale de la France cited earlier, and Andrea Giardina, ed., Storia Mondiale Dell’Italia Rome: 64
Laterza, 2017. 
  Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson, eds., The French revolution in global perspective, Ithaca, NY: 65
Cornell University Press, 2013, provides insightful chapters on the global histories of  the French revolution. 
 66
  Richard J. Evans, The pursuit of  power: Europe, 1815-1914, London: Penguin, 2016; C. M. Clark, ‘Power’, in Ulinka 
Rublack, ed., A concise companion to history, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 131-156; C. M. Clark, The sleepwalkers, 
London: Penguin, 2013; and Adam Tooze, The deluge: The great war and the remaking of  global order, 1916-1931, London: 
Penguin, 2014. 
 67
  Angelika Epple, ‘Lokalität und die Dimensionen des Globalen: Eine Frage der Relationen’, Historische 
Anthropologie 21, 1 (2013), 4-25, provides some thoughts on locality and globality, and the contributions in Birgit Schäbler 
(ed.), Area Studies und die Welt: Weltregionen und Neue Globalgeschichte (Vienna, 2007), discuss the integration of  area studies and 
global history. 
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The old universal historians – Chinese, Arab, or European – sought to tell the story of  other 
human communities as the frame for the history of  their own tribe. What distinguishes the 
enterprise of  global historians in the twenty-first century is our attempt to map the human 
past from and for the view of  humanity as a whole. This project is young and fragile. The 
critics of  global history are not wholly wrong to imply that it is always at risk of  become a 
new mask for imperial history, as hijacked by global elites it constructs new panoramas of  
centre and peripheries. There are good reasons, for example, why many African historians 
retain a measure of  hostility to Atlantic history, seeing it as paying attention more to those 
Africans most entangled in offshore European and American history.  More generally, 68
Euro-American history, particularly its anglophone variants, exerts a palpable drag on all 
attempts at extra-European history, both in its national, comparative and connective 
dimensions.  
There are good reasons for this. To an overwhelming extent, the weights and measures 
which we bring to Asian, African, and Latin American history find their standards in north 
west European history.  Our attempts at reciprocal comparison are distorted by how much 69
more the practitioners of  global history know about the West.  The legacy of  the ways in 70
which the world was integrated after c. 1600, by and in response to European imperial and 
cultural power, is a cognitive eurocentrism embedded in our methods.  To give two examples, 
consider how Marshall Hodgson’s proposition of  a Song dynasty ‘industrial revolution’, or 
Indian historiography’s constitution of  a ‘medieval period’ depend on an imported set of  
referents which inherently corrupt the enterprise of  measurement, ultimately cashing all 
phenomena into European standards. Ideas of  ‘revolution’, ideas of  ‘class’, ideas of  
‘progress’, even ideas of  ‘empire’ are lenses which distort at the same time as they allow us 
to see.  The challenge for twenty-first century global historians is to find new kinds of  
standards, in the physical sciences sense of  the word – that is to say methods, value 
judgments, and, most importantly, concepts – in the historical experience and historical self-
consciousness of  the tricontinent. We may even find our way to ways of  telling stories about 
the past which do not assume that history is being made from or for a given geographical or 
conceptual centre. 
  Megan Vaughan, ‘Africa and Global History’, in Berg, ed., Writing the History of  the Global, p. 200. 68
  Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra has repeatedly insisted that the problem is not merely one of  eurocentrism, but of  a 69
distorted North Atlantic anglophone idea of  global history, see for example Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, ‘On ignored global 
‘Scientific Revolutions’, Journal of  Early Modern History, 21, 2017, pp. 420-32, and  Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and Adrian 
Masters, The Radical Spanish Empire: Petitions and the Creation of  the New World Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
2018 forthcoming. 
  For one ingenious attempt see Gareth Austin, ‘Reciprocal comparison and African 70
History: Tackling conceptual eurocentrism in the study of Africa’s economic past’, 
African Studies,2007, 50(3), pp. 1-28.
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Global history has many futures. It needs to (continue to) break out of  the twentieth-century 
mode of  collecting national histories, which has sometimes turned global history into an 
equivalent of  the children’s card game, ‘Snap!’. Global history is not a federation of  
national and area studies history, as important and sovereign as these levels of  analysis are. It 
is the product of  engagements with the problem of  the global based on inspired 
comparative and connective thinking and not just the accumulation of  examples from 
different regions. Yet there are not only intellectual but also practical considerations which 
will help the field to develop further. What seems clear is that the enterprise of  global will 
depend on collaboration. The edited volume and the work of  translation are the natural 
media of  global history.  But these volumes, like many conferences, will be dialogues of  the 71
deaf  if  we do not work actively against the idea that the business of  history can or should be 
done in English, or that only that which is translated or translatable deserves our attention. 
If  we are serious about global history, more training in languages, particularly non-western 
ones, is an obvious priority. This must be matched by an acceleration of  the digitization of  
sources. We should prioritise this means of  repatriation, via internet, of  the archives of  Latin 
American, African, and Asian history held by former colonial powers, to be complemented 
by the digitalization of  archives outside of  Europe and Northern America.  72
 For an important attempt to bring into conversation Asian, African, Latin American and European global history 71
initiatives see Sven Beckert and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Global History, Globally: Research and Practice 
Around the World London: Bloomsbury, 2018 forthcoming. 
   The Global Labour History Network offers a model for such sharing of  sources and research, see Global 72
Labour History Network,  (accessed 12 November 2017).  For a discussion of  a model of  a collective global research 
project see Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk, ‘Covering the World: Textile Workers and Globalization, 1650–2000 
Experiences and Results of  a Collective Research Project’, in: Marcel van der Linden (ed.), Labour History Beyond Borders: 
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Global history is more important than ever before. Academically, it remains one of  the most 
dynamic and exciting fields of  historical studies. Politically, it is of  pressing importance as 
well. Retreating from global history would seem to be the least obvious response to the 
resurgence of  populist nationalism. One of  the reasons for the rise of  nationalist populism 
is the dominance of  national narratives in the popular historical imagination. As they 
connect present resentment to false memories of  lost national grandeur, these narratives are 
already unselfconscious arguments about global history. New kinds of  entangled national 
and global history, particularly as they speak to the public, have important kinds of  work to 
do. They may even provide us with a sense of  a shared global humanity. Lynn Hunt’s vision 
that a ‘more globally oriented history’ would ‘encourage a sense of  international citizenship, 
of  belonging to the world and not just to one’s own nationality’ and ultimately ‘produce 
tolerant and cosmopolitan global citizens’ couldn’t be more timely.  What is clear is that our 73
students and fellow citizens are profoundly conscious of  the global character of  many of  
our contemporary challenges – global warming, refugee crises, pandemics, war and terror, 
unemployment and the deterritorialisation of  capital. Our most pressing problems today go 
beyond the nation state (even resurgent chauvinism nationalism and anti-globalism 
themselves). The spectre of  global history will continue to haunt the corridors of  the 
world’s ivory towers, inspiring some perhaps, to see new worlds of  past and future.
  Lynn Hunt, Writing history in the global era, New York: W. W. Norton, 2014. 73
